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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jason Andrew Godwin, Sr., appeals from his judgment of conviction for the second 
degree murder of Kyle Anderson, entered upon a jury’s unanimous finding of his guilt. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In the evening of June 9, 2014, Godwin, in company with Ernie Ruiz, Beau Lynch, and a 
lady friend named Carla, drove up to Kyle Anderson’s trailer with the intention of robbing him 
of illegal drugs and/or stolen guns.  (See Int. Tr.,1 p.29, Ls.10-20; p.35, L.25 – p.37, L.22; p.51, 
Ls.11-19.)  At the trailer, Godwin killed Mr. Anderson by shooting him in the neck.  (Tr., p.768, 
Ls.6-12; p.825, Ls.3-11; p.897, L.19 – p.898 L.12; p.949, Ls.7-9; p.1134, L.25 – p.1135, L.5; 
p.1145, Ls.8-17.)  Amanda Jones, Mr. Anderson’s girlfriend, was present at the scene and a 
witness to the murder.  (See Tr., p.763, L.19 – p.774, L.21.)  After shooting Mr. Anderson, 
Godwin exited his vehicle and, holding a gun to Ms. Jones’s head, demanded that she tell him 
where the guns were, but she could not.  (Tr., p.772, L.9 – p.773, L.12; p.793, Ls.10-22; p.951, 
L.8 – p.952, L.4.)  Mr. Ruiz, meanwhile, had taken Mr. Anderson’s gun and was wiping it down.  
(Int. Tr., p.21, Ls.12-25; see also Tr., p.1251, L.15 – p.1252, L.14.)  Godwin took the gun from 
Mr. Ruiz.  (Int. Tr., p.22, Ls.2-6; see also Tr., p.1252, Ls.15-22.)  He also tried to throw Mr. 
Anderson, who was still alive, into the back of his truck, apparently with the intent of disposing 
of his body in the river.  (Compare Tr., p.792, Ls.8-12 with p.952, L.18 – p.953, L.4 and Int. Tr., 
                                            
1  There are multiple volumes of transcripts in the appellate record.  Citations to “Tr.” refer to the 
volume that includes the transcript for the evidentiary hearing held on 8/20/2015, the combined 
multiday trial transcripts, and the sentencing hearing transcript.  All page citations are to the 
<.pdf> file.  Citations to “Int. Tr.” refer to the district court’s transcription of the audio of 
Godwin’s police interview held on June 10, 2014, which is contained in the supplemental 
transcripts.  An audio recording of this interview was entered as State’s Exhibits 68 and 69 at 
Godwin’s trial.  (See Tr., p.1030, L.7 – p.1033, L.11.) 
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p.20, L.23 – p.21, L.10; see also Int. Tr., p.23, Ls.2-5; Tr., p.1275, Ls.19-24.)  Ms. Jones told 
Godwin and those with him that she would report the murder to the police, and they threatened to 
kill her, too.  (See Tr., p.792, Ls.12-15; p.793, Ls.3-7.)  Ms. Jones retreated into the trailer, 
locking the door behind her.  (Tr., p.774, L.19 – p.775, L.20.)  After Godwin and the others 
drove away, Ms. Jones flagged down a police officer and reported the murder.  (Tr., p.778, L.4 – 
p.779, L.24.) 
Following up on reports that Godwin’s vehicle was seen leaving the scene of the murder, 
police reached out to Godwin by phone at around 2:30 a.m. on June 10.  (R., p.501; see also Tr., 
p.1123, L.24 – p.1125, L.8.)  He claimed that he was away from the area, having left around 
noon the day before.  (R., p.501; see also Tr., p.1125, Ls.7-15; p.1258, Ls.3-13.)  However, later 
that morning, at approximately 8:30, Godwin called the police and then voluntarily came to the 
police substation an hour later for an interview.  (R., p.501; see also Tr., p.1126, L.17 – p.1127, 
L.11; p.1263, L.13 – p.1264, L.2.)  During that interview, both before and after receiving 
Miranda2 warnings, Godwin repeatedly admitted shooting Mr. Anderson, but claimed he did so 
in self-defense.  (See Int. Tr.)  He also told the police that both his and Mr. Anderson’s guns 
were hidden under Godwin’s bed in his trailer.  (Int. Tr., p.12, Ls.11-13; p.52, Ls.23-25; Tr., 
p.1045, Ls.14-23.)  With Godwin’s permission (Int. Tr., p.51, L.25 – p.52, L.6) and a warrant 
(R., pp.27-39; Tr., p.1078, L.24 – p.1079, L.1), police retrieved the firearms (Tr., p.1045, L.24 – 
p.1046, L.4; p.1113, Ls.1-13).   
The state charged Godwin with second degree murder.  (R., pp.55-56.)  Godwin filed a 
motion to suppress his confession (R., pp.178-89), which was denied (R., pp.500-08).  The state 
filed a motion in limine to prevent a pair of defense witnesses from testifying to specific 
                                            
2  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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instances of violent conduct by Mr. Anderson, of which Godwin was unaware before he 
murdered Mr. Anderson.  (R., pp.544-47.)  The district court granted the motion.  (R., pp.700-
01.)  Godwin also filed notice of his intent to put on the affirmative defense of self-defense (R., 
p.148) and requested jury instructions consistent therewith (R., pp.529-34), which the district 
court granted (Tr., p.1191, L.3 – p.1194, L.3; see also Jury Instruction Nos. 20-23).   
The case proceeded to trial, after which the jury rendered its unanimous verdict that 
Godwin was guilty of the second degree murder of Mr. Anderson.  (R., p.760.)  The district court 
entered judgment against Godwin and sentenced him to a unified term of 25 years with 15 years 





Godwin states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Godwin’s motion to suppress? 
 
II. Did the district court err when it ruled Mr. Godwin could only present 
opinion or reputation evidence of Mr. Anderson’s violent and/or aggressive 
character after showing that Mr. Godwin was aware of Mr. Anderson’s propensity 
for violence? 
 
III. Should this Court overrule State v. Custodio and hold specific instances of 
a victim’s conduct, showing a violent character, can be an essential element of a 
self-defense claim and are admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 405? 
 
IV. Did the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on justifiable homicide 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-4009(1) amount to fundamental error? 
 
V. Did the State violate Mr. Godwin’s right to a fair trial by committing 
prosecutorial misconduct? 
 
VI. Do the errors in Mr. Godwin’s case amount to cumulative error? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.) 
 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Godwin failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress his voluntary confession? 
 
2. Has Godwin failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when, adhering to 
binding precedent, it determined that specific instances of Mr. Anderson’s alleged conduct were 
inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 405? 
 
3. Godwin has failed to show any basis for overruling or disavowing State v. Custodio.  
Should this Court therefore decline Godwin’s invitation to overrule that precedent? 
 
4. Has Godwin failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of his unpreserved 
claim of instructional error? 
 
5. Has Godwin failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of his unpreserved 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct? 
 






Godwin Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion To 




Investigation into the June 9th murder of Mr. Anderson quickly led officers to suspect 
that Godwin could be a person of interest in the case.  The district court, setting forth background 
facts relevant to this investigation, explained that  
a vehicle noted to be Defendant’s was identified as leaving the scene of the crime.  
In light of that information, law enforcement travelled to the Defendant’s 
residence near Kooskia.  Officers did not find him at his residence, but observed 
that it looked like someone had left the place in a hurry.  His place was placed 
under surveillance. 
 
Idaho County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Doug Ulmer called Godwin on his 
cellphone at about 2:30 a.m. on June 10, 2014.  Godwin first told Ulmer that he 
was at home, but Ulmer told him that he was there and Godwin was not.  Godwin 
then said he had gone to Dudley, Idaho about noon on June 9 and was still there.  
During that conversation, Ulmer did not tell him why he wanted to talk to him. 
 
Defendant contacted Lieutenant Ulmer by phone about 8:30 a.m. on June 
10, and he voluntarily showed up for an interview about an hour later at the 
Kooskia Sheriff’s Office substation, where he was interviewed by Hewson…. 
 
(R., p.501.)  During that interview, before officers advised Godwin of his rights under Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the following exchange took place: 










Q. Okay.  I don’t like treating people like that, but you got to kind of 
understand what I am— 
 
A. They’re trying to accuse me of shooting this guy or (inaudible)? 
 
Q. They are saying that, yes, something happened between you and him, and 
it was more or less an accident.  And that’s all we’re trying to get cleared up.  If 
something happened between you guys and it was an accident, I wish that you 
would talk to us about it. 
 
A. Fine.  Pulled up there and— 
 
Q. What time? 
 
A. —the guy pointed a gun at me, and I grabbed my gun and shot him. 
 
(Int. Tr., p.9, Ls.2-19.)  Following this initial confession, Godwin made repeated confessions, 
both before and after being advised of his Miranda rights.  (See Int. Tr., pp.9-51.) 
Godwin moved to suppress his confessions, claiming that his statements were coerced 
and in violation of his supposed request for counsel.  (R., pp.178-89.)  The district court denied 
that motion finding both that Godwin’s statements were voluntary and that, as a matter of fact, he 
never requested counsel.  (R., pp.500-06.)  The district court further noted that, even had Godwin 
invoked his right to counsel, such invocation would be ineffective because Godwin was never in 
custody such that his Miranda rights could be invoked.  (R., pp.506-08.)3 
Now, for the first time on appeal, apparently conceding that his initial confession was 
voluntary and not offered while in custody, Godwin argues that this initial confession 
transformed his police interview into a custodial interrogation, such that Miranda warnings were 
then immediately required.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-34.)  This argument was never presented to 
                                            
3  The state makes no intimation regarding whether Godwin could effectively invoke his Miranda 
rights once those rights had been explained to him but before he was in custody.  The dispositive 
fact is that Godwin did not invoke those rights.  (R., p.505-06.)  And that fact is unchallenged on 
appeal.  (Appellant’s brief, p.15.) 
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the district court below and should not be considered on appeal.  Even if addressed, application 
of the correct legal standards to the facts shows no error in the district court’s conclusion that 
Godwin was not in custody such that the dictates of Miranda applied.  The district court correctly 
denied Godwin’s suppression motion and should be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that 
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional 
principles to those facts.  State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004). 
 
C. Godwin Has Not Preserved His Confession-As-Custody Argument For Appellate Review 
 
Below, Godwin presented two grounds on which to suppress his confession:  First, he 
argued that, because the police “employed minimization techniques, indicated that it sounded 
like [his murder of Mr. Anderson] was all just an accident, implied that there would be 
consequences for not telling the truth, told the defendant he was gaining credibility with his 
interrogator, and suggested that the defendant might not be arrested,” his confession was 
coerced.  (R., pp.184-85.)  Second, he argued that he unambiguously invoked his right to counsel 
under Miranda, and that right was not honored.  (R., pp.186-88.)  The district court found that 
Godwin’s confession was voluntary and that he never invoked his right to counsel.  (R., pp.502-
06.)  The district court further concluded that, even if Godwin had invoked his right to counsel, it 
would be irrelevant; Godwin, the district court found, was never in custody such that Miranda 
would apply.  (R., pp.506-08.)   
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On appeal, Godwin does not challenge the district court’s findings that his confession 
was voluntary and that Godwin never unambiguously invoked his right to counsel.  Instead, 
Godwin presents a narrower theory:  Citing to several out-of-state jurisdictions, he argues that 
his initial confession transformed his police interview into a custodial interrogation, and that 
officers’ failure to immediately inform him of his Miranda rights following that confession 
violated the Fifth Amendment.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-34.)  This is not the same theory that 
Godwin presented below, nor did he cite to any of the out-of-state cases now heavily relied upon 
by Godwin.  (Compare R., pp.178-89 with Appellant’s brief, pp.10-34.) 
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties 
will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”  State v. 
Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (citations omitted).  Thus, even 
where application of the correct legal standard would show error by the district court, if that 
standard was not argued to the district court the appellate court will not reverse.  See Id. at 275-
76, 396 P.3d at 704-05 (rejecting a “wrong result-wrong theory” approach and refusing to 
reverse the district court by application of the correct legal theory).  This is because it is 
“manifestly unfair” to ask the appellate court to decide a question the party failed to present to 
the trial court.  Id. at 276, 396 P.3d at 705 (quoting Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867)). 
Even if Godwin’s new theories had merit (which it will be shown below is a dubious 
proposition), it would be “manifestly unfair” to consider them and to address theories and issues 
not presented to the district court.  The new theories based on these authorities, raised for the 




D. Godwin Was Not In Custody Equivalent To Formal Arrest, And Therefore The Dictates 
Of Miranda Did Not Apply 
 
Even if Godwin’s novel theory could somehow be shoehorned into the argument he 
presented to the district court below, it would still fail on its merits.  To safeguard the privilege 
against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that before an individual is subjected to 
custodial interrogation, the interrogating officers must advise the individual of certain rights, 
including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.  Id., 384 U.S. at 478-79.  The test for 
determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda is whether, considering 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, there was a “formal arrest or 
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”  California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).  
The defendant bears the burden of establishing that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda.  
State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010). 
Below, Godwin asserted that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda because his 
police interview took place at the police station, he was the primary suspect in the murder of Mr. 
Anderson, and his interview was designed, with police employing minimization techniques, to 
elicit incriminating responses.  (R., pp.184, 88.)  As the United States Supreme Court explained 
in Beheler, these factors do not show custody for purposes of Miranda.  See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 
1123-25.  The Supreme Court has “explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not required 
‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned 
person is one whom the police suspect.’”  Id. at 1125 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).  
Rather, “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”  Id. 
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The district court properly weighed the totality of the circumstances and correctly 
rejected Godwin’s argument below, noting that Godwin 
came voluntarily to the sheriff sub-station for the interview.  He was not 
handcuffed or patted down before the interview.  At no time did Hewson [the 
interviewing officer] tell him that [he] had to stay and answer the questions.  A 
review of the transcript of the interview shows that Hewson was not threatening 
or intimidating.  The interview lasted about an hour, which included time for a 
cigarette break.  Hewson was the only officer talking with him, although Hewson 
testified that another officer accompanied Godwin when he went outside for a 
cigarette. 
 
(R., p.506.)  Godwin, therefore, was never in custody during the police interview. 
Godwin now argues on appeal that, though he was not in custody when he voluntarily 
came to the police station and began the interview, as soon as he made his initial confession to 
killing Mr. Anderson, Godwin’s noncustodial interview transformed into a custodial 
interrogation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-26.)  Godwin asserts that once a confession to a serious 
crime has been made, a future arrest is a foregone conclusion and no reasonable person would 
consider himself free to leave at that point.  (Id.)  But it appears that the Idaho Supreme Court 
has already rejected that approach; in James, supra, it held that even the explicit threat of 
(lawful) future arrest does not transform noncustodial questioning into a custodial interrogation.  
See James, 148 Idaho at 578, 225 P.3d at 1173. 
Without Idaho authority for his novel proposition, Godwin looks to several out-of-state 
courts and decisions, including the dissent in State v. Bartelt, 906 N.W.2d 684 (Wis. 2018).  The 
dissenting judge in that case, as quoted by Godwin on appeal, explained that it “stretches the 
bounds of credulity” that a suspect could “confess[] to a serious, violent felony … and then 
march past detectives on the way out of the interrogation room and the police station.”  Id. at 702 
(Bradley, J., dissenting).  But, as credulity-stretching as it may seem, that is exactly what 
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happened in this case:  After making his initial confession—in fact, after making repeated 
confessions—and even after receiving his Miranda warnings, Godwin took a cigarette break and 
not only left the interview room, he actually left the police station.  (Tr., p.126, L.19 – p.129, 
L.8; see esp. p.127, Ls.6-10.)   
That Godwin would reasonably feel free to leave during the interview is understandable 
when it is recognized that he did not exactly confess to a violent crime; rather, he consistently set 
forth an affirmative defense to a violent crime:  He had killed Mr. Anderson in self-defense.  (See 
Int. Tr., p.9, Ls.16-19; p.10, Ls.4-14; p.12, Ls.7-18; p.13, Ls.13-15; p.14, L.23 – p.15, L.13; p.16, 
Ls.4-5; p.16, L.25 – p.17, L.1; p.18, Ls.12-14; p.21, L.12 – p.22, L.14; p.23, Ls.10-21; p.24, 
Ls.2-8; p.26, L.2; p.27, Ls.7-10; p.36, Ls.6-9; p.38, L.12 – p.39, L.24; p.41, Ls.10-19; p.47, 
Ls.22-25; p.50, Ls.17-21.)  Godwin’s belief that he would be free to leave was also supported by 
the interviewing officer, who explained during the suppression hearing that “[i]f [Godwin] 
wanted to he was allowed to leave.  I did not have personally enough information to arrest him or 
detain him.  If he wanted to leave, as far as I was concerned, he could have left.”  (Tr., p.127, 
Ls.19-24.)  And during their interview, Officer Hewson repeatedly reassured Godwin that he was 
not under arrest and that arresting and charging decisions would be made by other officers.  (Int. 
Tr., p.15, L.17 – p.16, L.3; p.16, Ls.14-20; p.41, L.21 – p.42, L.2.)  Until Godwin was formally 
arrested, he was free to leave.   
Again, as the United States Supreme Court has made clear, “the ultimate inquiry is 
simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree 
associated with a formal arrest.”  Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 
495).  As the evidence demonstrates, there was no restraint on Godwin’s movements, much less 
the restraint associated with formal arrest.  Godwin has failed to meet his burden, both below and 
 
12 
on appeal, of demonstrating that he was in custody during his police interview such that the 
dictates of Miranda would apply to his case.  Until Godwin was formally arrested following his 
police interview, he was never in custody, and Miranda warnings, therefore, were not required.4 
 
E. Harmless Error 
Finally, under the facts of this case, any error in denying Godwin’s suppression motion 
would necessarily be harmless.  “[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, 
not a perfect one.”  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).  The standard for 
determining whether error is harmless is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the jury’s verdict “and that the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 488, 873 P.2d 122, 133 
(1994).  “An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon 
the evidence and argument presented during the trial, that the jury would have reached the same 
result absent the error.”  State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007) 
(citation omitted). 
Even if Officer Hewson’s failure to immediately explain to Godwin his rights under 
Miranda following Godwin’s initial confession violated Godwin’s rights, the district court’s error 
in admitting Godwin’s subsequent statements would be harmless.  First, Godwin does not seek to 
suppress his initial confession—Godwin in fact concedes that suppression would not apply to his 
initial confession (Appellant’s brief, p.17)—only his cumulative confessions.  The state, 
                                            
4  Godwin also asserts that his post-Miranda statements should be suppressed.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.26-34.)  Contrary to his assertions (again, raised for the first time on appeal), there is nothing 
in the interview transcript that suggests, much less shows, that Officer Hewson engaged in a 
“deliberate ask first, warn later” strategy to prevent Godwin from exercising his Miranda rights.  
Cf. State v. Wass, 162 Idaho 361, 396 P.3d 1243 (2017).  Rather, the officer did not immediately 
advise Godwin of his Miranda rights because Godwin was not in custody, and so Miranda did 
not apply.  (See Int. Tr., p.16, Ls.4-22.) 
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therefore, could properly rely in its case-in-chief on Godwin’s admission to shooting Mr. 
Anderson (Int. Tr., p.9, Ls.16-19), which caused his death.  Second, physical evidence—in this 
case the gun Godwin used to murder Mr. Anderson and the gun that was in Mr. Anderson’s 
possession—is not subject to suppression for a mere violation of Miranda.  United States v. 
Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636-37 (2004).  Therefore, the state would still be able to use the guns, 
located under Godwin’s bed in his trailer, in its case-in-chief at trial.  Third, statements elicited 
in violation of Miranda can be used in impeachment.  Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 
(2009).  With his confession to killing Mr. Anderson and the physical evidence tying him to the 
scene of the crime, Godwin’s only hope in acquittal was in presenting an affirmative defense.  To 
present that defense, he would have to take the stand.  Once he took the stand, his subsequent 
statements would still be admissible as impeachment.5 
Thus, even had the district court ruled as Godwin now claims it should have, the evidence 
that would be presented to the jury in that hypothetical trial—even if not presented in the same 
order or through the same means—would ultimately be the same as the evidence presented at 
Godwin’s actual trial.  This Court can therefore conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
ultimate verdict of guilt would have been the same.  Any error in failing to suppress Godwin’s 
statements made after his initial confession would therefore necessarily be harmless. 
 
II. 
Godwin Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When, Adhering To 
Binding Precedent, It Determined That Specific Instances Of Mr. Anderson’s Conduct Were 
Inadmissible Under Idaho Rule Of Evidence 405 
 
Godwin asserts that the district court erred when it granted the state’s motion in limine, 
prohibiting two of the defense’s witnesses “from testifying about specific instances of conduct 
                                            




unless proper foundation was laid to show that Mr. Godwin was aware of Mr. Anderson’s 
propensity for violence.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.34-39.)  This issue is controlled by the Court of 
Appeals’ opinion in State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197, 30 P.3d 975 (Ct. App. 2001), and its 
progeny, which held that, because “[p]roof of a victim’s violent character, standing alone, does 
not prove an element of a claim of self-defense” (i.e., it “does not show that the victim was the 
first aggressor in a particular conflict”), proof of character in the form of specific instances of 
conduct is not admissible.  Id., 136 Idaho at 204, 30 P.3d at 982.  Godwin recognizes this line of 
controlling cases (Appellant’s brief, p.39) and “acknowledges the district court’s decision 
regarding the admissibility of specific instances of a victim[‘]s conduct was proper based upon 
currently controlling precedent” (Appellant’s brief, p.42).  Godwin has therefore failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion6 when, properly following controlling precedent, it 
granted the state’s motion in limine.  The district court should be affirmed. 
 
III. 
Godwin Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Overruling Or Disavowing State v. Custodio 
 
Recognizing that the district court was bound by the controlling precedent of State v. 
Custodio, 136 Idaho 197, 30 P.3d 975 (Ct. App. 2001), Godwin invites this Court on appeal to 
overrule or disavow that case and its progeny, and to rule instead that specific instances of a 
victim’s conduct are admissible to show a violent character under Idaho Rule of Evidence 405.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.39-51.)  This Court should decline Godwin’s invitation.  Idaho 
jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedents.  The rule of stare decisis dictates that 
                                            
6  The state also notes that Godwin’s standard of review for this claim of error is itself in error.  
Godwin claims that the district court erred in its evidentiary ruling.  (Appellant’s brief, p.34.)  
Evidentiary rulings by the trial court are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, State v. Porter, 130 




controlling precedent be followed “unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time 
to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles 
of law and remedy continued injustice.”  State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002).7  
Godwin cannot meet this burden. 
Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, character evidence is admissible to show “a pertinent 
trait of character of the victim of the crime….”  I.R.E. 404(a)(2).  Rule 405 governs the 
admissibility of such evidence and provides two means for showing character: (1) by reputation 
or opinion, and (2) by specific instances of conduct.  It provides: 
(a) Reputation or opinion.  In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait 
of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to 
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.  On cross-examination, 
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
 
(b) Specific instances of conduct.  In cases in which character or a trait of 
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof 
may also be made of specific instances of the person’s conduct. 
 
I.R.E. 405.  In his brief, Godwin stresses that testimony of specific instances of Mr. Anderson 
drawing his gun during altercations would have been “especially relevant” to his self-defense 
claim, as a showing that Mr. Anderson had violent propensities might have supported Godwin’s 
theory that Mr. Anderson was the initial aggressor.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.44-51.)  But under the 
plain language of Rule 405(b), mere relevance is insufficient to admit testimony of specific 
instances of conduct.  Rather, the character trait must be “an essential element of a charge, claim, 
or defense.”  I.R.E. 405(b) (emphasis added).  Mr. Anderson’s alleged violent character, while 
                                            
7  Though Custodio is not binding on the Idaho Supreme Court, it was on the district court.  
Principles of stare decisis also apply because, absent an opinion from the Idaho Supreme Court, 
Custodio has been controlling precedent for almost two decades. 
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perhaps relevant to a claim of self-defense, is not essential, and therefore evidence of specific 
instances of conduct would be inadmissible. 
In Custodio, the Court of Appeals directly addressed this issue and adopted the majority 
view articulated in other jurisdictions, explaining: 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in United States 
v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 1995).  The court in Keiser determined that “the 
relevant question should be: would proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait 
by itself actually satisfy an element of the charge, claim, or defense?  If not, then 
character is not essential and evidence should be limited to opinion of reputation.”  
Id. at 856 (footnote omitted).  The court in Keiser went on to hold that the 
victim’s violent character did not constitute an essential element of a self-defense 
claim.  Id. at 857.  We agree.  Proof of a victim’s propensity for violence, 
standing alone, does not prove an element of a claim of self-defense. 
 
Thus, although evidence relating to the victims’ violent character was 
relevant for the purpose of inferring that the victims acted in conformity therewith 
on the morning in question, the victims’ propensities for violence was not an 
essential element of Custodio’s claim of self-defense.  Therefore, Custodio has 
failed to show that the district court erred in excluding this evidence in the form 
of a specific instance of the victims’ propensities for violence pursuant to Rule 
405.  
 
136 Idaho at 204, 30 P.3d at 982.   
Godwin asks this Court to reject the majority rule and instead adopt the minority view 
articulated in Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2005), and similar cases,8 that a 
                                            
8  The state notes that not all of the cases cited by Godwin stand for the proposition that specific 
instances of violent conduct to show the victim’s character are admissible under Rule 405(b) in 
self-defense cases.  For instance, Godwin claims that State v. McIntyre, 488 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 
1992), allowed evidence of specific conduct “to corroborate other evidence that victim was the 
aggressor.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.46.)  But review of that opinion shows that the admission of 
specific instances of conduct was limited to cross-examination, consistent with Rule 405(a).  See 
McIntyre, 488 N.W.2d at 617-18.  Similarly, People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 1984), is 
inapplicable; Illinois (like California and Wyoming) has a distinct rule allowing such evidence.  
See Ill. R. Evid. 405(b)(2).  Idaho has no such rule.  And Jordan v. Commonwealth, 222 S.E.2d 
573 (Va. 1976), was decided before Virginia first proposed rules of evidence in 1983, much less 
first adopted its rules in 2012. 
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specific instance of a victim’s violent conduct can be admissible because of its importance to a 
self-defense claim.  See id., 824 N.E.2d at 12.  States that have adopted Godwin’s interpretation 
of rules similar or identical to Rule 405(b) seem to have strayed from the pertinent question—
whether a victim’s character trait for violence constitutes “an essential element” of a self-defense 
claim—and instead resort to relevance-type considerations.  For instance, in Adjutant, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that evidence of a victim’s violent propensities 
was relevant to the first aggressor issue of self-defense, and so specific conduct could be 
admitted “to support the defendant’s claim of self-defense.”  Id. at 12-13.  Similarly, in State v. 
Lewchuk, 539 N.W.2d 847, 853-854 (Neb. App. 1995), the Nebraska Court of Appeals 
concluded that the defendant was “entitled to present evidence of specific instances of conduct 
demonstrating [the victim’s] violent, aggressive character to corroborate [the defendant’s] claim 
that [the victim] was the first aggressor.”  Id., 539 N.W.2d at 853, 855 (emphasis added).  And in 
State v. Dunson, 433 N.W.2d 676 (Iowa 1988), the Iowa Supreme Court went beyond the plain 
language of Rule 405(b)’s requirement that the character trait be an “essential element” of the 
defense, ruling instead “that the evidence in question was material to several elements of [the 
defendant’s] defense.”  Id., 433 N.W.2d at 680-81 (emphasis added).  Nowhere in these cases is 
there a reasoned explanation for departing from Rule 405(b)’s plain language allowing evidence 
of specific instances of conduct only when the victim’s “character or a trait of character … is an 
essential element” of the defense.   
The majority of states (including Idaho), as well as the federal courts, reject this approach 
and instead adhere to the plain language of Rule 405(b).  For instance, in State v. Barnes, 759 
N.E.2d 1240 (Ohio 2002), after setting forth the applicable elements of self-defense, the Ohio 
Supreme Court explained:  
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Although a victim’s violent propensity may be pertinent to proving that he acted 
in a way such that a defendant’s responsive conduct satisfied the elements of self-
defense, no element requires proof of the victim’s character or character traits.  A 
defendant may successfully assert self-defense without resort to proving any 
aspect of a victim’s character.  Therefore, Evid.R. 405(B) precludes a defendant 
from introducing specific instances of the victim’s conduct to prove that the 
victim was the initial aggressor. 
 
Id., 759 N.E.2d at 1244-45 (citations omitted; emphasis added).  Recognizing that “some courts 
in other jurisdictions [had] reached contrary results,” the Ohio Supreme Court chose to align 
itself with the majority rule, noting that the “[f]ederal courts, interpreting the analogous 
Fed.R.Evid. 404 and 405, have held that specific instances of a victim’s violent propensities are 
not admissible to prove whether the victim was the initial aggressor in a particular instance.”  Id. 
(citing Keiser, 57 F.3d at 857; United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 308 (7th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1152 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Piche, 981 F.2d 706, 
713 (4th Cir. 1992)).  The Ohio Supreme Court concluded: 
Given the plain language of Evid.R. 404 and 405 and the weight of 
compelling persuasive authority, we hold that a defendant asserting self-defense 
cannot introduce evidence of specific instances of a victim’s conduct to prove that 
the victim was the initial aggressor. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding the evidence of [the victim’s] prior instances of conduct, 
and the court of appeals erred in holding to the contrary. 
 
Id.  
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]n ‘essential element’ 
for purposes of … Rule 405, extends only to those elements that a party must prove or disprove 
to make out a prima facie case for a claim or defense.  An accused can assert self-defense 
successfully without offering any evidence regarding a victim’s character.”  State v. Jenewicz, 
940 A.2d 269, 281 (N.J. 2008).  Thus, “a victim’s violent character is not an essential element of 
self-defense.”  Id.  The majority of other states have taken this same approach.  See, e.g., State v. 
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Jackson, 841 N.W.2d 791, 787-88 (Wisc. 2014) (specific instances of conduct to show violent 
character to bolster first aggressor theory not essential and so not admissible); Anderson v. State, 
118 S.W.3d 574, 578 (Ark. 2003) (victim’s violent character “is not an essential element of a 
defendant’s self-defense claim in a first-degree murder case because one might plead self-
defense after having killed the most gentle soul who ever lived”); State v. Hutchinson, 959 P.2d 
1061, 1073 (Wash. 1998); Brooks v. State, 683 N.E.2d 574, 576-77 (Ind. 1997); State v. Newell, 
679 A.2d 1142, 1144-45 (N.H. 1996); State v. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 551 (Minn. 1988); 
State v. Doherty, 437 A.2d 876, 877 (Me. 1981); Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 70 (N.D. 
1981) (specific instances of conduct essential to defense only in rare “character in issue” cases). 
The Arizona Court of Appeals has also joined “the majority of jurisdictions with similar 
evidentiary rules,” and held that “a defendant may not introduce evidence of specific acts 
unknown to the defendant at the time of the alleged crime to show that the victim was the initial 
aggressor.”  State v. Fish, 213 P.3d 258, 270 (Ariz. App. 2009).  The logic of this rule is 
compelling and should continue to be upheld by this Court.  Idaho law does not recognize a 
theory of retroactive self-defense.  Unless Godwin was aware of Mr. Anderson’s alleged violent 
tendencies before he murdered him, such rumored character traits could not have played a role in 
Godwin’s decision to gun down Mr. Anderson—much less could specific instances of conduct of 
which Godwin was completely unaware.   
Godwin cannot show that Custodio was manifestly wrong, unjust, or unwise.  Consistent 
with Custodio, the majority of state and federal courts follow the plain language of Rules 404 
and 405 and hold that Rule 405(b) does not permit, in a self-defense case, a victim’s character 
for violence to be proved by specific instances of conduct.  Regardless of whether such proof 
may be relevant to one or more of the elements of self-defense, no element of that affirmative 
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defense actually requires proof of the victim’s character or character traits.  Godwin, therefore, 
was able to assert his self-defense claim in this case without having to prove Mr. Anderson’s 
character for violence through specific instances of conduct.  Godwin has failed to provide any 
valid reason for overruling or disavowing Custodio.  This precedent, and the district court’s 
ruling based upon this precedent, should be affirmed. 
 
IV. 
Godwin Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions 
 
A. Introduction 
Godwin argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court committed fundamental 
error when, after giving Godwin’s requested jury instructions (which were consistent with the 
affirmative defense he presented), the district court did not then, sua sponte, give additional jury 
instructions, which were never requested, on an additional affirmative defense, which was never 
raised by Godwin.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.51-66.)  Application of the correct legal standards to 
the facts of this case shows no error, much less fundamental error entitling Godwin to review of 
this unpreserved issue. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the appellate 
court exercises free review.  State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65 
(2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)).  “An erroneous 
instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury 
or prejudiced a party.”  State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 




C. Where Godwin Affirmatively Accepted The Jury Instructions Below, Any Claim Of 
Instructional Error Is Waived And Should Not Be Considered On Appeal 
 
As a prefatory matter, if this case is assigned to the Idaho Supreme Court, it should 
reinstate the rule that claims of instructional error not raised before the district court are waived 
for purposes of appeal.  This rule was recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Carter, 
103 Idaho 917, 919, 655 P.2d 434, 436 (1981).  The rule and its logic were later discussed by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225, 228, 786 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1990).  In 
Smith, the Court explained that the criminal trial underlying Carter took place in 1978, and the 
version of Idaho Criminal Rule 30 that was then in effect stated, “No party may assign as error 
any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto prior to the time that 
the jury is charged.”  Id.  In 1980, however, Rule 30 was amended and this sentence was 
removed.  Id.  Because that language had been removed from the rule, the Idaho Supreme Court 
retreated from its holding in Carter and allowed defendants to challenge jury instructions on 
appeal, even where they had not objected below.  Id. at 229, 786 P.2d at 1131. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 30 has since been amended again.  In 2016, when Godwin stood 
trial, the rule once more contained the language: 
No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless 
the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the 
objection. 
 
I.C.R. 30(b) (2004).9  Under the Idaho Supreme Court’s holdings and logic in Carter and Smith, 
supra, because the rule again does not allow assigning as error the giving (or failure to give) 
specific instructions without objection, any such claim of error is waived.   
                                            




Moreover, under the facts of this case, even if Godwin’s claim of instructional error is not 
waived by operation of Rule 30(b), Godwin affirmatively waived any objections to the 
instructions.  The district court’s formal jury instruction conference is reported in the trial 
transcript.  (See Tr., pp.1183-97.)  During that conference, the district court methodically 
reviewed each instruction with the parties.  (Id.)  Defense counsel made several requests for 
modifications to the instructions, all of which were granted.  (See Tr., p.1185, L.3 – p.1186, L.2; 
p.1190, Ls.9-25; p.1192, L.14 – p.1195, L.16; p.1195, L.24 – p.1196, L.10.)  The district court 
asked, “Are there any other additional instructions requested by defense at this time?”  (Tr., 
p.1196, Ls.10-11.)  Defense counsel responded, “Not at this time, Your Honor” (Tr., p.1196, 
L.12), and the district court reserved the issue until defense counsel could consult with Godwin 
and had presented his defense (Tr., p.1196, Ls.13-16).  After the defense closed its case, 
instructions were again taken up by the court and finalized.  (See Tr., p.1302, L.6 – p.1304, 
L.25.)  The district court again asked defense counsel if there were “any other issues with 
reference to jury instructions.”  (Tr., p.1303, L.25 – p.1304, L.2.)  Defense counsel responded, 
“No, Your Honor.  I believe that covers it.”  (Tr., p.1304, Ls.3-4.)  The parties then thoroughly 
reviewed the final jury instructions and counsel reported back to the district court that the 
defense had no objections to the jury instructions.  (Tr., p.1305, Ls.3-14.) 
If there were any errors or omissions in the jury instructions, it would at best result in 
invited error on appeal.  “It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully 
complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited.  Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or 
invited are not reversible.”  State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 379, 313 P.3d 1, 35 (2013) (quoting 
State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 673 P.2d 436, 438 (1983)) (internal citations omitted).  The 
purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who “caused or played an important 
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role in prompting a trial court” to take a particular action from “later challenging that decision on 
appeal.”  State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999).  Having affirmatively 
accepted the jury instructions below, Godwin should not now be heard on appeal to argue that 
the jury instructions were in error, even under the fundamental error standard. 
 
D. Godwin Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, Entitling Him To 
Review Of His Unpreserved Claim Of Instructional Error 
 
If the Court addresses the merits of Godwin’s unpreserved claim of instructional error, 
that claim still fails.  Homicide is justifiable if committed in self-defense, as set forth in Idaho 
Code §§ 18-4009 and 18-4010.  These statutes, in pertinent part, provide the following:   
Idaho Code section 18–4009: 
 
Homicide is … justifiable when committed by any person in either of the 
following cases: 
 
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person … or to do some great 




3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person ... when there is 
reasonable ground to apprehend a design ... to do some great bodily injury, and 
imminent danger of such design being accomplished.... 
 
Idaho Code section 18–4010: 
 
A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned in 
subdivision[] 3 of the preceding section, to prevent which homicide may be 
lawfully committed, is not sufficient to justify it.  But the circumstances must be 
sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing must 
have acted under the influence of such fears alone. 
 
Below, Godwin asked for instructions on justifiable homicide consistent with Idaho Code § 18-
4009(3) (R., pp.529-33), which were granted by the district court (See Instruction Nos. 20-23).  
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Godwin now claims on appeal that the district court committed fundamental error when it failed 
to also instruct the jury on justifiable homicide under Idaho Code § 18-4009(1), though the 
defense never requested such instructions below.   
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be 
made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.”  State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 (“An 
error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal.”) (citing State v. Sheahan, 
139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)).  This principle applies to alleged errors in jury 
instructions.  See I.C.R. 30(b)(4) (“No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give 
an instruction unless the party objects to the action before the jury retires to consider its verdict.  
The objection must distinctly state the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of 
the objection.”); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865.  Absent a timely objection, the 
appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental error 
doctrine.  Id.; see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
To establish fundamental error, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged 
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was 
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. 
 
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  Godwin cannot meet this burden.  Application of the correct legal 
standards to the evidence presented in this case shows no error in the jury instructions, much less 




1. Based On The Evidence Presented Below, Godwin Was Not Entitled To A 
Justifiable Homicide Instruction Under Idaho Code § 18-4009(1) 
 
Before the issue of fundamental error can be reached, the first inquiry is whether there 
was error at all.  State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 227, 335 P.3d 561, 567 (2014).  “In charging 
the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for their information.”  State v. 
Hall, 161 Idaho 413, 423, 387 P.3d 81, 91 (2016).  “A defendant is entitled to an instruction 
where there is a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that would support the 
theory.”  State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 90, 831 P.2d 555, 558 (1992) (internal quotations 
omitted).  A defendant, however, is not entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense that is 
unsupported by the evidence.  State v. Johns, 122 Idaho 873, 880-81, 736 P.2d 1327, 1334-35 
(1987).  Under the evidence presented in Godwin’s case, he was not entitled to an instruction on 
justifiable homicide under Idaho Code § 18-4009(1), so there can be no error in the district 
court’s failure to instruct the jury on that (unraised) theory. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court noted in Hall, justifiable homicide under subsection (1) 
requires the defendant to be resisting an “actual, ongoing attack” that attempted to inflict great 
bodily harm.  Hall, 161 Idaho at 423, 387 P.3d at 91.  Justifiable homicide under subsection (3), 
however, only requires that the defendant be responding to an immediate threat of great bodily 
harm, and that his action be precipitated by a reasonable fear of such immediate harm.  I.C. 
§§ 18-4009(3), 18-4010.  In other words, justifiable homicide under subsection (1) applies when 
responding to an aggravated battery, I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-907, or at least an inchoate aggravated 
battery, I.C. §§ 18-901(1), 18-905; whereas subsection (3) applies when responding to an 
aggravated assault by threat, I.C. §§ 18-901(2), 18-905. 
The evidence presented below at best showed that Godwin’s murder of Mr. Anderson 
was in response to an aggravated assault by threat, I.C. §§ 18-901(2), 18-905.  Godwin 
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consistently claimed, both during his police interview and at trial (though alone of all the 
witnesses that testified), that he shot Mr. Anderson in response to the latter “pointing a gun at 
[him].”  (See, e.g., Int. Tr., p.9, Ls.16-19; Tr., p.1246, L.6 – p.1247, L.18.)  But Godwin never 
claimed that Mr. Anderson fired the gun at him.  Clearly the act of pointing a gun at someone, by 
itself, could reasonably be interpreted as a threat of immediate harm and, if believed by the jury, 
would fit squarely under subsection (3).  However, in a case relating to firearms, until Mr. 
Anderson actually discharged the weapon at Godwin, there was no actual ongoing attack to 
which Godwin could respond—just the threat of a potential attack.  Therefore, justifiable 
homicide under subsection (1) was not applicable to Godwin’s case, and the district court could 
not err by failing to give an instruction to which Godwin was not entitled. 
 
2. Even If The Evidence Presented In This Case Could Be Stretched To Meet The 
Evidentiary Standard Of Idaho Code § 18-4009(1), Godwin Has Still Failed To 
Show Fundamental Error  
 
Even if Godwin could demonstrate that he was entitled, based on the evidence presented 
at trial, to instructions on justifiable homicide under subsection (1), he still cannot show 
fundamental error in the omission of such unrequested instructions.  First, he cannot meet his 
burden under the first prong of Perry of establishing that the alleged errors violated an unwaived 
constitutional right.  Godwin contends that the giving of his requested self-defense instructions, 
which were consistent with Idaho Code § 18-4009(3), without giving unrequested instructions 
consistent with Idaho Code § 18-4009(1), violated his due process right to a fair trial by, 
essentially, lowering the state’s burden to disprove his affirmative defense.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.62-65.)  This argument must fail because there is no constitutional obligation that the state 
disprove an affirmative defense. 
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As the United States Supreme Court has held, due process demands that a jury find 
“beyond a reasonable doubt … every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged.”  Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 231-32 (1987) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970)).  Due process does not, however, require that the state disprove a defendant’s affirmative 
defense.  Id. at 236.  Rather, a requirement that the state “assume[] the burden of disproving 
affirmative defenses” is a matter of state law, and states that place the burden on defendants to 
prove an affirmative defense are not “in violation of the Constitution.”  Id. (citing Patterson v. 
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977)).  Because the state had no constitutional burden to 
disprove Godwin’s (unraised) self-defense claim, he cannot show that failure to instruct the jury 
on the unrequested theory of self-defense violated his constitutional rights.10 
A defendant does have a constitutional due process right to present his defense, In re 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), and that right was honored.  Godwin does not argue that he did 
not get to present his defense; rather, he argues that the district court somehow erred when it did 
not supplant Godwin’s theory of the case (that Mr. Anderson pulled a gun on him and, fearing 
for his life, he killed Mr. Anderson in self-defense (see Tr., p.1047, L.7 – p.1048, L.4; p.1246, 
L.6 – p.1247, L.18)) for what Godwin now thinks may have been a better theory.  But “[a] 
defendant in a criminal action is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury 
under proper instructions,” not the district court’s theory.  State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285, 
647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982) (emphasis added).  Godwin’s argument amounts to an assault on the 
attorney-client relationship and should be rejected. 
                                            
10  While Godwin makes a passing reference to Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution as 
supporting his claim of a due process violation (see Appellant’s brief, p.62), he has offered no 
argument why that provision should be interpreted any differently than its federal counterpart.  
This Court should therefore decline to consider any argument that the Idaho Constitution affords 
greater protection than United States Constitution in this regard.  See State v. Wheaton, 121 
Idaho 404, 406-07, 825 P.2d 501, 503-04 (1992). 
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This is underscored by the second prong of Perry, which requires that Godwin show that 
the alleged error is “clear or obvious” on the existing record, “without any need for additional 
information,” including information “as to whether the failure to object” to the allegedly 
erroneous instructions “was a tactical decision.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  
Godwin claims that defense counsel’s decision to pursue the affirmative defense of justifiable 
homicide exclusively under Idaho Code § 18-4009(3) instead of also under subsection (1) could 
have served no tactical purpose.  (Appellant’s brief, p.65.)  That is simply untrue.  Even if the 
facts could be stretched to fit a theory that Godwin’s murder of Mr. Anderson was in response to 
an ongoing attack, they would still have to be stretched.  The facts, as related by Godwin, clearly 
fit a self-defense theory of responding to a reasonable threat of imminent harm much better.  A 
clear, concise argument, focused on the defendant’s strongest theory and strongest evidence, is 
always tactically superior to a lengthy, sometimes confusing, and often inconsistent argument. 
Finally, Godwin cannot meet his burden under the third prong of Perry of establishing a 
reasonable probability that the error he alleges actually affected the outcome of the trial.  See 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  Godwin asserts prejudice due to the fact that, to 
sustain a claim of self-defense under Idaho Code 18-4009(3), the defendant must have been 
responding to a reasonable fear, whereas there is no such requirement under subsection (1).  (See 
Appellant’s brief, pp.53-55, 66.)  But even assuming, as Godwin does, that the elements under 
subsection (1) would be easier to meet than under subsection (3), failure to instruct on the former 
would not affect the outcome of Godwin’s trial.  For Godwin to prevail on a claim of self-
defense under subsection (1) but fail on the claim he actually raised, the jury must have 
concluded (1) that Mr. Anderson pulled a gun on Godwin—despite every other witness testifying 
that Mr. Anderson did not display a gun (see Tr., p.765, L.24 – p.766, L.3; p.897, Ls.5-11; p.947, 
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Ls.6-16); (2) that Godwin killed Mr. Anderson only in response to this ongoing attack 
(assuming, arguendo, that the mere act of drawing a weapon constitutes an ongoing attack rather 
than a threat of attack, which it does not), and not for some other reason; and (3a) that Godwin, 
despite his consistent testimony to the contrary (see, e.g., Tr., p.1246, Ls.13-23; p.1247, Ls.5-18; 
p.1273, Ls.11-14), really was not in fear for his life, or (3b) that fear for one’s life when under 
“attack” by a gun-wielding belligerent is not reasonable.  Godwin has failed to establish the 
prejudice required under the third prong of Perry. 
Godwin has failed to show, under the facts of this case, that he was entitled to a jury 
instruction on justifiable homicide under Idaho Code § 18-4009(1).  He has therefore failed to 
show instructional error, much less fundamental error.  Even if the facts presented below could 
be stretched to fit a theory of self-defense under subsection (1), Godwin has failed to show 
fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue:  Godwin has failed to show 
that he was constitutionally entitled to the state carrying any burden to disprove his affirmative 
defense, much less a clear violation of that right; he has failed to show that defense counsel’s 
decision to pursue self-defense under subsection (3) instead of subsection (1) could not have 
served a tactical purpose; and he has failed to show prejudice.  Having failed to show 
fundamental error, Godwin is not entitled to review of this unpreserved issue. 
 
V. 
Godwin Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Review Of His Unpreserved 
Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
A. Introduction 
Cherry-picking several quotes, Godwin argues, for the first time on appeal, that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by allegedly “vouching” for the state’s case and witnesses.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.66-74.)  Application of the correct legal standards to the record, however, 
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shows that Godwin has failed to show error, much less fundamental error entitling him to review 
of this unpreserved issue. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends on 
whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.”  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2008).  If a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly improper 
closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial 
misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level 
of fundamental error.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). 
 
C. The Challenged Portions Of The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument Do Not Constitute 
Misconduct, Much Less Fundamental Error 
 
Because Godwin failed to preserve his claims of prosecutorial misconduct by timely 
objection below, he is required to show fundamental error on appeal.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 
245 P.3d at 978.  To establish fundamental error, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged 
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was 
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. 
 
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  Because review of the record shows that the prosecutor’s statements 
were not improper, Godwin has failed to show error, much less fundamental error entitling him 
to review of these unpreserved claims of error. 
“Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and 
discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom.”  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
 
31 
720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citations omitted).  Prosecutorial misconduct only occurs where 
the prosecutor “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial 
of due process.”  State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318, 127 P.3d 212, 221 (Ct. App. 2005).  With 
respect to alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing argument, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated: 
Isolated passages of a prosecutor’s argument, billed in advance to the jury 
as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the same proportions [as 
consistent and repeated misrepresentation that may have a significant impact on a 
jury’s deliberations].  Such arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are 
seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently 
results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear.  While these 
general observations in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest 
that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark 
to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy 
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging 
interpretations. 
 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has reiterated the importance of reviewing closing arguments 
in light of their improvisational nature, noting that “in reviewing allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct [the appellate court] must keep in mind the realities of trial.”  State v. Field, 144 
Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-428, 725 
P.2d 128, 132-133 (1986)).  Moreover, a prosecutor’s comments “must be evaluated in light of 
defense conduct and in the context of the entire trial.”  Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 
440 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986) 
(“[t]he prosecutors’ comments must be evaluated in light of the defense argument that preceded 
it”); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“only by [viewing the prosecutor’s 
comments in context] can it be determined whether the prosecutor’s conduct affected the fairness 
of the trial”).  Finally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized “[t]he right to due process does 
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not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one,” and the function of appellate review 
is “not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did 
not interfere with the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 
816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991).  
Application of the foregoing standards shows that the prosecutor’s statements, taken in 
context and recognizing the improvisational and imprecise nature of closing argument, do not 
constitute misconduct, much less fundamental error. 
As noted above, fundamental error requires Godwin to show the clear violation of an 
unwaived constitutional right.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  As the United States 
Supreme Court explained in Young, the primary danger in a prosecutor’s vouching for credibility 
or expressing personal opinion (unsupported by evidence) of the defendant’s guilt is that it may 
“convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, 
supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant’s right to be 
tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury….”  Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19.  On 
appeal, Godwin claims that the prosecutor crossed this line and that his “statements went much 
further than the permissible bounds and encouraged the jury to rely on the prosecutor’s beliefs.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.68.)  In fact, Godwin’s cherry-picked quotes discussing the credibility of 
state’s witnesses Amanda Jones and Beau Lynch show the opposite.   
In Godwin’s first quote discussing Amanda Jones, the prosecutor told the jurors that they 
had to judge the witnesses’ testimony and credibility, based on the evidence, and reminded the 
jury that the attorneys’ statements, including his, were not evidence:  Specifically, he said he  
would submit to [the jury] and you judge her testimony.  I would submit to you 
that she was telling the truth, and that’s something you have to decide, not me.  
And what Mr. Monson and I tell you is not evidence, but the evidence proves that 
Mr. Godwin is guilty of second degree murder.   
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(Tr., p.1325, Ls.17-24 (emphasis added).)   
Godwin removes his second quote relating to Ms. Jones’s credibility—wherein the 
prosecutor explained that, if the jury believed Ms. Jones’s credible testimony, it would not be 
consistent to also accept Godwin’s claim of self-defense (see Tr., p.1328, L.13 – p.1329, L.2)—
from its context:  A lengthy review of the evidence and an argument for central inference that 
should arise therefrom: that Godwin’s actions were wholly inconsistent with acting in self-
defense when he murdered Mr. Anderson.  (Tr., p.1326, L.9 – p.1331, L.19.)  It is not improper 
for the prosecutor to express a belief that a witness is credible when his comment is based on 
inferences from evidence presented at trial.  See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 
956, 969 (2003) (citing State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997)).  Rather, 
discussing the evidence fully, and inferences that should arise from the evidence, including 
which witnesses are credible, is appropriate closing argument.  See State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 
623, 627, 262 P.3d 266, 270 (Ct. App. 2011).   
Godwin also removes the quote relating to Beau Lynch—that though he was apparently 
scared and nervous while testifying, Mr. Lynch still told the truth (see Tr., p.1326, Ls.15-18)—
from the context of this same review of the evidence (all of which evidence was presented to the 
jury) that showed that Godwin did not act in self-defense when he murdered Mr. Anderson.  
Again, a prosecutor may properly express his belief that a witness is credible when that belief is 
based solely on inferences from evidence presented at trial.  But even reviewing Godwin’s 
excerpt, removing all of this context, the prosecutor’s statement is still appropriate closing 
argument.  Not only did the prosecutor not allude to anything outside of the record or place his 
personal prestige ahead of the witness’s credibility, he again specifically told the jury to “judge 
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[the witness’s] testimony” and reminded them that “these credibility questions are what you have 
to answer.”  (Tr., p.1326, Ls.9-19.) 
Godwin’s final cherry-picked quote—the prosecutor’s submission to the jury that the 
evidence presented by its witnesses was credible (see Tr., p.1360, Ls.15-18)—comes from the 
end of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument.  Godwin ignores all of the context from which this 
quote was lifted.  First, during the defense argument that preceded the prosecutor’s rebuttal 
argument, defense counsel claimed that “[i]n order to make their case, the State really needs you 
to believe Amanda Jones.”  (See Tr., p.1339, Ls.4-5.)  As the prosecutor noted, that was not true:  
The state’s case relied on Ms. Jones’s testimony, and Mr. Lynch’s, and Ernie Ruiz’s, and the 
expert testimony of Dr. Groben, and “all of the physical evidence that you’ve examined and the 
photos and you can consider all that in your deliberations.”  (Tr., p.1356, Ls.15-20.)  The state 
then, after again briefly reviewing the evidence and key instructions, submitted the issue of 
credibility to the jury, asking them to “follow Judge Fitzmaurice’s instructions and not what the 
attorney[s] say,” but rather to “decide this case” based on the overwhelming evidence of 
Godwin’s guilt presented at trial.  (Tr., p.1359, L.19 – p.1360, L.19.)   
The prosecutor’s closing argument was proper.  Godwin cannot show error, much less 
fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue. 
Moreover, even if Godwin could show that any of the prosecutor’s statements “went 
much further than the permissible bounds,” his claim would still fail under the fundamental error 
standard.  As noted above, part of the second prong of Perry requires the defendant to show that 
his counsel’s failure to object was not a tactical decision.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 
980.  Godwin cannot meet this burden.  Defense counsel may have reasonably chosen to refrain 
from objecting to the above-referenced statements so as not to focus the jury’s attention on the 
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strong credibility of the state’s witnesses, contrasted with the strong incredibility of Godwin’s 
testimony, as shown by the evidence presented during the trial. 
Third, even if Godwin could show that the prosecutor clearly vouched for the witnesses’ 
credibility based solely on his personal beliefs, and that such violated a constitutional right, 
Godwin cannot show the prejudice required to sustain a claim of fundamental error.  As noted 
above, the primary danger in vouching for a witness’s credibility is the possibility that the jury 
might believe that there is evidence “known to the prosecutor,” but “not presented to the jury.”  
Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19.  The prosecutor did not convey any impression that he was aware of 
evidence that had been withheld from the jury; rather, he relied on the evidence which had been 
presented to the jury and argued inferences therefrom.  Godwin, therefore, was not prejudiced by 
the prosecutor’s so-called statements of personal belief. 
Ultimately, Godwin has failed to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, let alone 
misconduct that satisfies the Perry fundamental error standard, with respect to any of the 
challenged portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument.  Having failed to show fundamental 
error, Godwin is not entitled to review of this unpreserved issue.  The judgment of the district 
court should be affirmed. 
 
VI. 
Godwin Has Failed To Establish That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This Case 
 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, 
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.  State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 
P.2d 708, 716 (1994).  A necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a finding of more 
than one error.  State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407, 958 P.2d 22, 33 (Ct. App. 1998).  These 
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must be preserved errors, as, analytically, unpreserved errors cannot be accumulated.11  Godwin 
appears to recognize this limitation, at least to a degree, limiting his claim of cumulative error to 
the first four issues in his brief, omitting the unpreserved allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.  
(See Appellant’s brief, p.74.)  Godwin has failed to show that any objected-to errors occurred at 
his trial, and therefore the doctrine is inapplicable to this case.  See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 
Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Even if this Court concludes that objected-to errors occurred during Godwin’s trial, 
Godwin has still failed to show that any of those alleged errors deprived him of his due process 
right to a fair trial, and only that would require reversal.  State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 
16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors still deemed harmless absent 
prejudice); State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997).  As noted 
above, “the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”  Delaware 
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).  Even assuming some error on the issues where 
Godwin raised objections below, such errors did not deprive Godwin of a fair trial, and he has 
therefore failed to show reversible error on any of these issues. 
Finally,12 any error or accumulation of errors is still harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
“if the Court can conclude, based upon the evidence and argument presented during the trial, that 
the jury would have reached the same result absent the error.”  State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 
463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007) (citation omitted).  In this case, the evidence of Godwin’s 
                                            
11  Unpreserved errors will only be reached if they constitute fundamental error.  State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).  To show fundamental error, the appellant is 
required to show that he was prejudiced by a clear violation of a constitutional right which 
occurred at trial.  Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  If the appellant shows fundamental error, then the 
appellant is entitled to reversal.  Id.  If the alleged violation was not prejudicial, then there is no 
fundamental error to accumulate.   
 
12  The state notes that this argument applies with equal force to all prior issues addressed herein. 
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guilt was overwhelming.  It was uncontested that he killed Mr. Anderson when he shot him in 
the neck.  (See Tr., p.768, Ls.6-12; p.825, Ls.3-11; p.897, L.19 – p.898, L.12; p.949, Ls.7-9; 
p.1134, L.25 – p.1135, L.5; p.1145, Ls.8-17.)  Godwin’s only defense—that he had acted in self-
defense—rested on his own testimony that, immediately upon arriving at Mr. Anderson’s trailer, 
Mr. Anderson threatened him with a gun and, fearing for his life, Godwin responded by drawing 
his weapon and shooting Mr. Anderson.  (See Tr., p.1246, L.6 – p.1247, L.18.)  But every other 
witness testified consistently that (1) Godwin’s gun was already drawn and trained on Mr. 
Anderson when they first arrived at the trailer (see Tr., p.764, L.20 – p.765, L.20; p.895, Ls.6-15; 
p.946, L.16 – p.947, L.3) and (2) Mr. Anderson never drew his gun (see Tr., p.765, L.24 – p.766, 
L.3; p.897, Ls.5-11; p.947, Ls.6-16).  Godwin’s whole defense, therefore, rested on his own 
credibility and nothing else, and that credibility was thoroughly impeached.  (See Tr., p.1258, 
L.1 – p.1298, L.15.)  This Court can therefore conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any 
possible errors, or accumulation of errors, did not affect the outcome of this trial.  Godwin’s 
conviction for the second degree murder of Mr. Anderson should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Godwin’s conviction for the second 
degree murder of Kyle Anderson. 




      /s/ Russel J. Spencer_____________ 
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